Jan 12, 2026, 12:13 AM
The SSRF Campaign: Forcing Servers to Phone Home
The first campaign exploited server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities, techniques that manipulate servers into making unauthorized outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
The operation targeted two primary vectors: Ollama’s model pull functionality and Twilio SMS webhook integrations.
Attackers injected malicious registry URLs into Ollama deployments to force HTTP requests to adversary infrastructure, while simultaneously manipulating MediaUrl parameters in Twilio integrations to trigger unwanted outbound connections.
The infrastructure analysis traced the campaign to two dedicated IPs with extensive CVE exploitation histories, resulting in more than 4 million sensor hits.
The operators demonstrated professional capability, with attack patterns consistent with reconnaissance feeding into larger exploitation pipelines.
Organizations should implement strict model pull restrictions, configure egress filtering to prevent SSRF callbacks, and deploy rate-limiting for suspicious ASNs.
DNS blocking of OAST callback domains and alerts for rapid multi-endpoint probing queries provide immediate detection mechanisms for ongoing threats.
Source: https://cyberpress.org/hackers-actively-...ployments/
The first campaign exploited server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities, techniques that manipulate servers into making unauthorized outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
The operation targeted two primary vectors: Ollama’s model pull functionality and Twilio SMS webhook integrations.
Attackers injected malicious registry URLs into Ollama deployments to force HTTP requests to adversary infrastructure, while simultaneously manipulating MediaUrl parameters in Twilio integrations to trigger unwanted outbound connections.
The infrastructure analysis traced the campaign to two dedicated IPs with extensive CVE exploitation histories, resulting in more than 4 million sensor hits.
The operators demonstrated professional capability, with attack patterns consistent with reconnaissance feeding into larger exploitation pipelines.
Organizations should implement strict model pull restrictions, configure egress filtering to prevent SSRF callbacks, and deploy rate-limiting for suspicious ASNs.
DNS blocking of OAST callback domains and alerts for rapid multi-endpoint probing queries provide immediate detection mechanisms for ongoing threats.
Source: https://cyberpress.org/hackers-actively-...ployments/