<![CDATA[BreachForums - Databases]]> https://bf.st/ Sun, 18 Oct 2026 01:45:36 +0000 MyBB <![CDATA[website https://6cn.co.il/ , 16 pages with accounts for credit.]]> https://bf.st/Thread-website-https-6cn-co-il-16-pages-with-accounts-for-credit Sun, 18 Oct 2026 00:08:31 +0000 MashroomBlind]]> https://bf.st/Thread-website-https-6cn-co-il-16-pages-with-accounts-for-credit Founded in 2003, the National Roads Authority of Israel plans, develops and maintains most of the inter-city roads in Israel. This authority also builds and plans interchanges, bridges etc. The road length that is under control of the authority is approximately 6,500 km long. Some inter-city routes are built by concessionaires and private companies in exchange for payment from the government, outside of the responsibility of the National Roads Authority, while others are developed and maintained by regional or municipal road authorities. The National Roads Authority of Israel took over the responsibility for most of Israel's intercity roads from the Public Works Department (PWD) in 2003. Modern road development in the country began during the British Mandate of Palestine. In 1921 the Mandate government founded an engineering branch for carrying out infrastructure projects, this later became the PWD, which later evolved into the National Roads Authority of Israel. In ancient Israel the development of an unpaved yet extensive road system has been attributed to efforts under King Solomon.
israel road #6 National roads – numbered with one digit (e.g. Route 1, Jerusalem-Tel Aviv)
website https://6cn.co.il/ 

i have 16 pages data accounts for credits.]]> Founded in 2003, the National Roads Authority of Israel plans, develops and maintains most of the inter-city roads in Israel. This authority also builds and plans interchanges, bridges etc. The road length that is under control of the authority is approximately 6,500 km long. Some inter-city routes are built by concessionaires and private companies in exchange for payment from the government, outside of the responsibility of the National Roads Authority, while others are developed and maintained by regional or municipal road authorities. The National Roads Authority of Israel took over the responsibility for most of Israel's intercity roads from the Public Works Department (PWD) in 2003. Modern road development in the country began during the British Mandate of Palestine. In 1921 the Mandate government founded an engineering branch for carrying out infrastructure projects, this later became the PWD, which later evolved into the National Roads Authority of Israel. In ancient Israel the development of an unpaved yet extensive road system has been attributed to efforts under King Solomon.
israel road #6 National roads – numbered with one digit (e.g. Route 1, Jerusalem-Tel Aviv)
website https://6cn.co.il/ 

i have 16 pages data accounts for credits.]]> <![CDATA[BRISBANE AIRPORT id.bne.com.au logins]]> https://bf.st/Thread-BRISBANE-AIRPORT-id-bne-com-au-logins Sun, 18 Oct 2026 00:01:22 +0000 MashroomBlind]]> https://bf.st/Thread-BRISBANE-AIRPORT-id-bne-com-au-logins happy for some credits for this data. 


sample:
 https://id.bne.com.au/login:eri*njamin@g...:Iwas1*996!
https://id.bne.com.au/login:jason@sh*net...*****G2aJF
https://id.bne.com.au/login:jit****86@gmail.com:B*007]]> happy for some credits for this data. 


sample:
 https://id.bne.com.au/login:eri*njamin@g...:Iwas1*996!
https://id.bne.com.au/login:jason@sh*net...*****G2aJF
https://id.bne.com.au/login:jit****86@gmail.com:B*007]]> <![CDATA[medibank.com.au accounts for credits]]> https://bf.st/Thread-medibank-com-au-accounts-for-credits Sat, 17 Oct 2026 23:57:27 +0000 MashroomBlind]]> https://bf.st/Thread-medibank-com-au-accounts-for-credits total lines of data 5382... 

sample: 
Line  4294366: https://members.medibank.com.au:jjsull***@optusnet.com.au:o****9
      Line  5471007: https://members.medibank.com.au:su***ana5091@gmail.com:A***4
    Line  6281461: https://members.medibank.com.au:to***va@hotmail.com:pu***mpi10
    Line  7118679: https://members.medibank.com.au:gi*4@bigpond.com.au:le*11
    Line  8873641: members.medibank.com.au/login.html:19/07/1992:Honest456
    Line 14369607: https://secure.medibank.com.au:au*ean:Da*h99]]> total lines of data 5382... 

sample: 
Line  4294366: https://members.medibank.com.au:jjsull***@optusnet.com.au:o****9
      Line  5471007: https://members.medibank.com.au:su***ana5091@gmail.com:A***4
    Line  6281461: https://members.medibank.com.au:to***va@hotmail.com:pu***mpi10
    Line  7118679: https://members.medibank.com.au:gi*4@bigpond.com.au:le*11
    Line  8873641: members.medibank.com.au/login.html:19/07/1992:Honest456
    Line 14369607: https://secure.medibank.com.au:au*ean:Da*h99]]> <![CDATA[Israeli spyware used in ‘zero click’ hack on Al Jazeera]]> https://bf.st/Thread-Israeli-spyware-used-in-%E2%80%98zero-click%E2%80%99-hack-on-Al-Jazeera Sat, 17 Oct 2026 23:38:26 +0000 MashroomBlind]]> https://bf.st/Thread-Israeli-spyware-used-in-%E2%80%98zero-click%E2%80%99-hack-on-Al-Jazeera [align=start]    Israeli spyware used in ‘zero click’ hack on Al Jazeera staff
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTNqhH4KzxY[/align]
[/align]]]> [align=start]    Israeli spyware used in ‘zero click’ hack on Al Jazeera staff
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTNqhH4KzxY[/align]
[/align]]]> <![CDATA[An Israeli Trojan Horse - CANBDIRU, tARGETS JOURNALISTS WITH DEVILS TOUNGUE MALWARE]]> https://bf.st/Thread-An-Israeli-Trojan-Horse-CANBDIRU-tARGETS-JOURNALISTS-WITH-DEVILS-TOUNGUE-MALWARE Sat, 17 Oct 2026 23:15:44 +0000 MashroomBlind]]> https://bf.st/Thread-An-Israeli-Trojan-Horse-CANBDIRU-tARGETS-JOURNALISTS-WITH-DEVILS-TOUNGUE-MALWARE Department of Justice, FBI, DEA, the State Department, and the White House. Several of the
alleged breaches, these agents say, can be traced to two hi-tech communications companies, Verint
Inc. (formerly Comverse Infosys), and Amdocs Ltd., that respectively provide major wiretap and
phone billing/record-keeping software contracts for the U.S. government.  Together, Verint and
Amdocs form part of the backbone of the government’s domestic intelligence surveillance
technology.  Both companies are based in Israel – having arisen to prominence from that country’s
cornering of the information technology market – and are heavily funded by the Israeli government,
with connections to the Israeli military and Israeli intelligence (both companies have a long history
of board memberships dominated by current and former Israeli military and intelligence officers).
  Verint is considered the world leader in “electronic interception” and hence an ideal
private sector candidate for wiretap outsourcing. Amdocs is the world’s largest billing service for
telecommunications, with some $2.8 billion in revenues in 2007, offices worldwide, and clients
that include the top 25 phone companies in the United States that together handle 90 percent of
all call traffic among U.S. residents. The companies’ operations, sources suggest, have
been infiltrated by freelance spies exploiting encrypted trapdoors in Verint/Amdocs technology
and gathering data on Americans for transfer to Israeli intelligence and other willing customers
(particularly organized crime). “The fact of the vulnerability of our telecom backbone is
indisputable,” says a high level U.S. intelligence officer who has monitored the fears among federal
agents. “How it came to pass, why nothing has been done, who has done what – these are the
incendiary questions.” If the allegations are true, the electronic communications gathered up by the
NSA and other U.S. intelligence agencies might be falling into the hands of a foreign government.
 Reviewing the available evidence, Robert David Steele, a former CIA case officer and today one of
the foremost international proponents for “public intelligence in the public interest,” tells me that
“Israeli penetration of the entire US telecommunications system means that NSA’s
warrantless wiretapping actually means Israeli warrantless wiretapping.”
As early as 1999, the National Security Agency issued a warning that records of U.S. government
telephone calls were ending up in foreign hands – Israel’s, in particular.   In 2002, assistant U.S.
Attorney General Robert F. Diegelman issued an eyes only memo on the matter to the chief
information technology (IT) officers at the Department of Justice. IT officers oversee
everything from the kind of cell phones agents carry to the wiretap equipment they use in the
field; their defining purpose is secure communications. Diegelman’s memo was a
reiteration, with overtones of reprimand, of a new IT policy instituted a year earlier, in July 2001, in
an internal Justice order titled “2640.2D Information Technology Security.”  Order 2640.2D
stated that “Foreign Nationals shall not be authorized to access or assist in the development,
operation, management or maintenance of Department IT systems.” This might not seem
much to blink at in the post-9/11 intel and security  overhaul. Yet 2640.2D was issued a full two
months before the Sept. 11 attacks.  What group or groups of foreign nationals had close access to
IT systems at the Department of Justice?  Israelis, according to officials in law enforcement.
 One former Justice Department computer crimes prosecutor tells me, speaking on background, “I’ve
heard that the Israelis can listen in to our calls.” `Retired CIA counterterrorism and
counterintelligence officer Philip Giraldi says this is par for the course in the history of Israeli
penetrations in the U.S.  He notes that Israel always features prominently in the annual FBI
report called “Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage” – Israel is second only to
China in stealing U.S. business secrets.  The 2005 FBI report states, for example, “Israel has an
active program to gather proprietary information within the United States. These collection
activities are primarily directed at obtaining information on military systems and advanced
computing applications that can be used in Israel’s sizable armaments industry.”  A key Israeli
method, warns the FBI report, is computer intrusion. In the big picture of U.S. government spying on
Americans, the story ties into 1994 legislation called the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, or CALEA, which effected a sea- change in methods of electronic surveillance. 
Gone are the days when wiretaps were conducted through on-site tinkering with copper switches. 
CALEA mandated sweeping new powers of surveillance for the digital age, by linking remote
computers into the routers and hubs of telecom firms – a spyware apparatus linked in real-time, all
the time, to American telephones and modems. CALEA made spy equipment an inextricable
ligature in our telephonic life. Top officials at the FBI pushed for the legislation, claiming it would
improve security, but many field agents have spoken up to complain that CALEA has done
exactly the opposite. The data-mining techniques employed by NSA in its wiretapping exploits could
not have succeeded without the technology mandated by CALEA. It could be argued that
CALEA is the hidden heart of the NSA wiretap scandal.]]> Department of Justice, FBI, DEA, the State Department, and the White House. Several of the
alleged breaches, these agents say, can be traced to two hi-tech communications companies, Verint
Inc. (formerly Comverse Infosys), and Amdocs Ltd., that respectively provide major wiretap and
phone billing/record-keeping software contracts for the U.S. government.  Together, Verint and
Amdocs form part of the backbone of the government’s domestic intelligence surveillance
technology.  Both companies are based in Israel – having arisen to prominence from that country’s
cornering of the information technology market – and are heavily funded by the Israeli government,
with connections to the Israeli military and Israeli intelligence (both companies have a long history
of board memberships dominated by current and former Israeli military and intelligence officers).
  Verint is considered the world leader in “electronic interception” and hence an ideal
private sector candidate for wiretap outsourcing. Amdocs is the world’s largest billing service for
telecommunications, with some $2.8 billion in revenues in 2007, offices worldwide, and clients
that include the top 25 phone companies in the United States that together handle 90 percent of
all call traffic among U.S. residents. The companies’ operations, sources suggest, have
been infiltrated by freelance spies exploiting encrypted trapdoors in Verint/Amdocs technology
and gathering data on Americans for transfer to Israeli intelligence and other willing customers
(particularly organized crime). “The fact of the vulnerability of our telecom backbone is
indisputable,” says a high level U.S. intelligence officer who has monitored the fears among federal
agents. “How it came to pass, why nothing has been done, who has done what – these are the
incendiary questions.” If the allegations are true, the electronic communications gathered up by the
NSA and other U.S. intelligence agencies might be falling into the hands of a foreign government.
 Reviewing the available evidence, Robert David Steele, a former CIA case officer and today one of
the foremost international proponents for “public intelligence in the public interest,” tells me that
“Israeli penetration of the entire US telecommunications system means that NSA’s
warrantless wiretapping actually means Israeli warrantless wiretapping.”
As early as 1999, the National Security Agency issued a warning that records of U.S. government
telephone calls were ending up in foreign hands – Israel’s, in particular.   In 2002, assistant U.S.
Attorney General Robert F. Diegelman issued an eyes only memo on the matter to the chief
information technology (IT) officers at the Department of Justice. IT officers oversee
everything from the kind of cell phones agents carry to the wiretap equipment they use in the
field; their defining purpose is secure communications. Diegelman’s memo was a
reiteration, with overtones of reprimand, of a new IT policy instituted a year earlier, in July 2001, in
an internal Justice order titled “2640.2D Information Technology Security.”  Order 2640.2D
stated that “Foreign Nationals shall not be authorized to access or assist in the development,
operation, management or maintenance of Department IT systems.” This might not seem
much to blink at in the post-9/11 intel and security  overhaul. Yet 2640.2D was issued a full two
months before the Sept. 11 attacks.  What group or groups of foreign nationals had close access to
IT systems at the Department of Justice?  Israelis, according to officials in law enforcement.
 One former Justice Department computer crimes prosecutor tells me, speaking on background, “I’ve
heard that the Israelis can listen in to our calls.” `Retired CIA counterterrorism and
counterintelligence officer Philip Giraldi says this is par for the course in the history of Israeli
penetrations in the U.S.  He notes that Israel always features prominently in the annual FBI
report called “Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage” – Israel is second only to
China in stealing U.S. business secrets.  The 2005 FBI report states, for example, “Israel has an
active program to gather proprietary information within the United States. These collection
activities are primarily directed at obtaining information on military systems and advanced
computing applications that can be used in Israel’s sizable armaments industry.”  A key Israeli
method, warns the FBI report, is computer intrusion. In the big picture of U.S. government spying on
Americans, the story ties into 1994 legislation called the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, or CALEA, which effected a sea- change in methods of electronic surveillance. 
Gone are the days when wiretaps were conducted through on-site tinkering with copper switches. 
CALEA mandated sweeping new powers of surveillance for the digital age, by linking remote
computers into the routers and hubs of telecom firms – a spyware apparatus linked in real-time, all
the time, to American telephones and modems. CALEA made spy equipment an inextricable
ligature in our telephonic life. Top officials at the FBI pushed for the legislation, claiming it would
improve security, but many field agents have spoken up to complain that CALEA has done
exactly the opposite. The data-mining techniques employed by NSA in its wiretapping exploits could
not have succeeded without the technology mandated by CALEA. It could be argued that
CALEA is the hidden heart of the NSA wiretap scandal.]]> <![CDATA[PRECISION FACADES — first publication batch (samples)]]> https://bf.st/Thread-PRECISION-FACADES-%E2%80%94-first-publication-batch-samples Sat, 17 Oct 2026 23:05:20 +0000 MashroomBlind]]> https://bf.st/Thread-PRECISION-FACADES-%E2%80%94-first-publication-batch-samples shareholder and board records, company accounts, staff equipment and
contact data, unpaid-invoice ledgers, director statements, and banking
profile documents. Samples of a much larger body of company data removed
from Precision Facades systems and held off-site.

Further batches follow until settlement.

http://nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw...snad.onion

Please support us !]]> shareholder and board records, company accounts, staff equipment and
contact data, unpaid-invoice ledgers, director statements, and banking
profile documents. Samples of a much larger body of company data removed
from Precision Facades systems and held off-site.

Further batches follow until settlement.

http://nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw...snad.onion

Please support us !]]> <![CDATA[DEDISERVE — first publication batch (samples)]]> https://bf.st/Thread-DEDISERVE-%E2%80%94-first-publication-batch-samples Sat, 17 Oct 2026 22:57:24 +0000 MashroomBlind]]> https://bf.st/Thread-DEDISERVE-%E2%80%94-first-publication-batch-samples records), rebate accounts, and introducing-broker account tables. These are
samples of a much larger body of client and financial data removed from
Dediserve systems and held off-site.

Further batches follow until settlement.

http://nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw...snad.onion]]> records), rebate accounts, and introducing-broker account tables. These are
samples of a much larger body of client and financial data removed from
Dediserve systems and held off-site.

Further batches follow until settlement.

http://nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw...snad.onion]]> <![CDATA[PG GROUP (PURE OPTIONS), first publication batch.]]> https://bf.st/Thread-PG-GROUP-PURE-OPTIONS-first-publication-batch Sat, 17 Oct 2026 22:45:38 +0000 MashroomBlind]]> https://bf.st/Thread-PG-GROUP-PURE-OPTIONS-first-publication-batch corpus, financial and contract backups from the accounting workstation, the shared volume
inventory and the network perimeter configuration of a Michigan cannabis operator.

Further batches follow until settlement.

http://nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw...snad.onion]]> corpus, financial and contract backups from the accounting workstation, the shared volume
inventory and the network perimeter configuration of a Michigan cannabis operator.

Further batches follow until settlement.

http://nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw...snad.onion]]> <![CDATA[Bank of Saint Lucia - 6.5 gb]]> https://bf.st/Thread-Bank-of-Saint-Lucia-6-5-gb Sat, 17 Oct 2026 18:50:15 +0000 tqodeOnTele]]> https://bf.st/Thread-Bank-of-Saint-Lucia-6-5-gb @tqode on telegram

10k rows on the master sheet, lots of different data as well

or, if you are an experienced caller, send me a voice message on telegram and lets work this data ourselves 

[img=800]https://i.postimg.cc/FYjzLhp8/Screenshot-2026-10-17-142710.png[/img]

[img=800]https://i.postimg.cc/bZQrtqgM/Screenshot-2026-10-17-142800.png[/img]

[img=800]https://i.postimg.cc/nXvrDn2P/Screenshot-2026-10-17-143058.png[/img]]]> @tqode on telegram

10k rows on the master sheet, lots of different data as well

or, if you are an experienced caller, send me a voice message on telegram and lets work this data ourselves 

[img=800]https://i.postimg.cc/FYjzLhp8/Screenshot-2026-10-17-142710.png[/img]

[img=800]https://i.postimg.cc/bZQrtqgM/Screenshot-2026-10-17-142800.png[/img]

[img=800]https://i.postimg.cc/nXvrDn2P/Screenshot-2026-10-17-143058.png[/img]]]> <![CDATA[Best Mail:Pass / User:Pass Any Target 🍸]]> https://bf.st/Thread-DATABASE-Best-Mail-Pass-User-Pass-Any-Target-%F0%9F%8D%B8 Sat, 17 Oct 2026 17:08:39 +0000 kittyman]]> https://bf.st/Thread-DATABASE-Best-Mail-Pass-User-Pass-Any-Target-%F0%9F%8D%B8 ass / UserTongueass Any Target 🍸
🔣Good For Many Service 🔣

Country 🗺 : De, It, Fr, Nl,Ua, EU, Br, Ee,UK, USA, At, Au, Zl, Pt, Cz, Nz, No, Dk, Sg, Jp, Il, To, Ar, Pl , Ch, Ca , Uy, Bg and other 

tg: trapstartrap]]> ass / UserTongueass Any Target 🍸
🔣Good For Many Service 🔣

Country 🗺 : De, It, Fr, Nl,Ua, EU, Br, Ee,UK, USA, At, Au, Zl, Pt, Cz, Nz, No, Dk, Sg, Jp, Il, To, Ar, Pl , Ch, Ca , Uy, Bg and other 

tg: trapstartrap]]> <![CDATA[gdfggfdfdfdgfd]]> https://bf.st/Thread-gdfggfdfdfdgfd Sat, 17 Oct 2026 16:24:28 +0000 laodinst]]> https://bf.st/Thread-gdfggfdfdfdgfd <![CDATA[gdfgfdfdgfd]]> https://bf.st/Thread-gdfgfdfdgfd Sat, 17 Oct 2026 16:23:19 +0000 laodinst]]> https://bf.st/Thread-gdfgfdfdgfd <![CDATA[Searching for spanish database]]> https://bf.st/Thread-DATABASE-Searching-for-spanish-database Sat, 17 Oct 2026 15:20:35 +0000 abdeldelazonne912]]> https://bf.st/Thread-DATABASE-Searching-for-spanish-database  
Telegram: @pilote010]]>  
Telegram: @pilote010]]> <![CDATA[fdsfdsfsddsf]]> https://bf.st/Thread-fdsfdsfsddsf Sat, 17 Oct 2026 15:04:29 +0000 laodinst]]> https://bf.st/Thread-fdsfdsfsddsf <![CDATA[bvvcgvcgcxgfgfd]]> https://bf.st/Thread-bvvcgvcgcxgfgfd Sat, 17 Oct 2026 15:02:15 +0000 laodinst]]> https://bf.st/Thread-bvvcgvcgcxgfgfd
(10 hours ago)laodinst Wrote: ffdghfdgfhfdhfd
]]>
(10 hours ago)laodinst Wrote: ffdghfdgfhfdhfd
]]>